







































Efﬁ  ciency or Politics? ad
serie




Los documentos de trabajo del Ivie ofrecen un avance de los resultados de las 
investigaciones económicas en curso, con objeto de generar un proceso de 
discusión previo a su remisión a las revistas científicas. Al publicar este 
documento de trabajo, el Ivie no asume responsabilidad sobre su contenido.  
 
Ivie working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way 
in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific 
journals for their final publication. Ivie’s decision to publish this working paper 
does not imply any responsibility for its content. 
 
 
La Serie AD es continuadora de la labor iniciada por el Departamento de 
Fundamentos de Análisis Económico de la Universidad de Alicante en su 
colección “A DISCUSIÓN” y difunde trabajos de marcado contenido teórico. 
Esta serie es coordinada por Carmen Herrero. 
 
The AD series, coordinated by Carmen Herrero, is a continuation of the work 
initiated by the Department of Economic Analysis of the Universidad de 
Alicante in its collection “A DISCUSIÓN”, providing and distributing papers 
marked by their theoretical content. 
 
 
Todos los documentos de trabajo están disponibles de forma gratuita en la web 
del Ivie http://www.ivie.es, así como las instrucciones para los autores que 
desean publicar en nuestras series. 
 
Working papers can be downloaded free of charge from the Ivie website 
http://www.ivie.es, as well as the instructions for authors who are interested in 










Edita / Published by: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Depósito Legal / Legal Deposit no.: V-2807-2011 
 




Understanding R&D Policy:  







This paper searches for the determinants of government-funded R&D. The goal is to disentangle 
whether the efficiency considerations overwhelmingly emphasized by the theoretical literature 
are indeed the main driving force behind public R&D expenditures. Another goal of the paper is 
to assess whether other types of innovation policy such as the degree of patent protection can 
have an impact on private R&D. I find that there are important differences between rich and 
poor nations at this respect. In particular, R&D-specific efficiency factors are not significant to 
explain public R&D in rich nations, whereas related variables such as the access to private credit 
and knowledge spillovers are important in less developed economies; in rich countries, public 
innovation effort can be better explained by the political economy variables that determine the 
size of governments. Private R&D, on the other hand, depends in high income economies on 
R&D policies that try to improve R&D efficiency, but is highly determined by goverment size in 
less income nations. Results suggest that more research on political economy theories of 
innovation is essential to understand R&D investment. 
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The seminal work of Robert Solow (1956, 1957, and 1962) concluded that technolog-
ical change is key to sustained economic growth. Over the years, the recognition of
this fundamental result has pushed innovation to the forefront of the policy agenda.
Innovation consists on the discovery of new products and processes, and requires R&D
investment in most instances. Governments, therefore, design policies to increase the
amount of R&D in the economy. One the one hand, policies such as anti-brain-drain
measures, nancial market reforms, improvement of the patent protection system,
and tax reliefs, among others, try to incentive private R&D. Government-funded
R&D, on the other, allocates resources directly to the inventive activity.1
We could say that the theoretical literature explains R&D policy based on e-
ciency considerations. There are many market failures related to R&D investment.
Following Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959), the possible failure of perfect competition
to achieve an optimal allocation of resources is a consequence of the increasing re-
turns, inappropriability, and uncertainty that surround the invention process. Papers
such as Romer (1990), Jones and Williams (2000), and Agnion and Howitt (1992,
2006) have analyzed in detail their consequences on the allocation of R&D. Empir-
ically, these market failures make that papers like Griliches (1992) and Jones and
Willians (1998), among others, nd evidence that the social return to R&D is well
above its private counterpart.
The last paragraph implies that we already know quite a bit about the normative
side of Government funded R&D. But what about the positive side? There is no
paper in the literature that tries to disentangle the forces that determine R&D policy
in reality.2 This is an important gap because eciency considerations are not the only
potential determinant of government's policy. There is an important literature on the
political economy of the size of governments (see below), which suggests that public
intervention in R&D could be also a consequence of political pressure. If the last force
1An example of the importance of R&D policy is given by the European Union (EU) objectives
of the 2002 Barcelona Council: Increasing R&D in the EU from 1.9% to 3% of GDP by 2010 to
become one of the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.
2Within the literature that tries to test whether public R&D complements or crows out private
R&D, there are some papers that estimate reduced form equations for government-funded R&D
using rm- and industry-level data; see David et al. (2000) for a review. The goal of these equations
is, however, generating predicted values for public R&D that can be used as an instrument in the
private R&D expression.
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4ends up being important, it should lead the theoretical literature to seriously think
of introducing it into our models of R&D, and policymakers to rebuild innovation
policy more closely linked to eciency considerations.
This paper sheds light on this issue. More specically, I address the following
questions. What are the determinants of government-funded R&D? Which theory
receives more support? Does private R&D respond to innovation policy in the ex-
pected direction? Does R&D policy look optimal? In addition, given that most
empirical papers at the aggregate level focus on total R&D but private and pub-
lic R&D can respond dierently to incentives, another contribution of the paper is
studying whether previous results hold when we split both components.
The key nding is that the answer to those questions is dierent for dierent
country groups. More specically, public R&D is mainly related to political factors
such as budgetary pressure, political rights, government size and Wagner's law in rich
nations. In less developed countries, however, public R&D is associated to the size of
the economy and the size of the government, but also to eciency considerations such
as the relative lack of private credit and knowledge spillovers. Private R&D, on the
other hand, is in rich nations mainly a response to eciency variables that include
market size, access to credit, patent protection, and distance to the frontier. In
developing countries, private innovation eort is highly determined by the size of the
public sector; thus suggesting that the public sector in those economies is required to
build the knowledge, human and physical capital bases necessary for successful R&D
eort.
I proceed as follows. The next section briey revises the R&D data. Section 3
introduces a well known model of optimal R&D investment and discusses dierent
theories of R&D and the size of nations. Section 4 describes the empirical model, the
data employed in the estimation exercise, and the econometric methodology. Results
are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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R&D investment, both at the public and private levels, diﬀer substantially across
nations. Figure 1 shows 5-year averages for the period 1981-2005 for a sample of 44
nations against their level of income.3 We see that both private and public R&D
display positive trends. That is, economies, on average, allocate more and more
resources to the inventive activity as they become richer. However, the cloud of
points for private R&D highlights a steeper trend and is more heteroskedastic and
dispersed. For example, the slope coeﬃcient of the straight line that better ﬁts the
data is 6E-05 and the coeﬃcient of variation is 0.86 for this variable, whereas the
same numbers become 2E-05 and 0.54 for the public R&D cloud. For low levels of
development, the government is the main source of R&D funds. Private ﬁnancing
becomes relatively more important as income per capita rises.
The same patters are obtained if we look at particular nations. Figure 2 shows
3These nations are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
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R&D data for a set of OECD and middle income nations. Rich countries, the ones
that are closer to the technology frontier, are usually the economies that invest more
in R&D. In Figure 2, countries that invest at least 2.5% of GDP include only Fin-
land, Israel, Japan, S. Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. South Korea and
Israel belong to the set of emerging economies that are making a big eﬀort in R&D.
Singapore is another example of these emerging economies. We can see in the Figure
that Singapore allocated to invention and innovation a larger fraction of its GDP
than richer economies like Italy and Spain.
Latin American nations are on the other side of the spectrum presented in Figure
2. They invest a relatively small fraction in R&D. Argentina and Mexico show the
lowest private investment (0.13) and public investment (0.23), respectively. If we sum
up both components, the minimum total R&D investment is the 0.42% of Argentina,
compared to the maximum of 4.6% of Israel. There are clearly other nations in the
world that invest even less in R&D. For example, in our original 44 country sample,
the economies that show the lowest average R&D shares (close to 0.28%)f o rt h e
2001-2005 interval are Pakistan, Bolivia, and Uganda.
4
73 R&D Theories
There are several theories that highlight possible determinants of invention eort and
could help explain the above general patterns. If we focus on public R&D, they
emphasize market-failures. The special nature of ideas implies that several market
failures surround their production. Ideas are non-rivalrous and, therefore, their pro-
duction generates important externalities. Among them, knowledge spillovers across
rms (Howitt 1999) and time (Romer 1990) generate positive eects on the social
value of R&D. On the other hand, prot stealing coming from new products on old
vintages, that is, the Schumpeter's (1942) creative destruction impact formalized by
Agnion and Howitt (1992), and duplication of R&D eort across independent rms
represent negative externalities. Another negative externality is present in contexts
where the adoption of foreign technology is important. R&D directed to adapt tech-
nology to local conditions can suer from diminishing imitation opportunities (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 1997).
As an example to illustrate these market failures, consider an economy similar to
the one in Romer (1990). The economy is populated by utility-maximizing innitely-
lived consumers endowed with one unit of labor that they supply each period inelas-
tically. There are three types of activities: consumption goods production, interme-
diate goods manufacturing, and R&D investment. The latter is intended to learn
new designs for new types of producer durables, being the source of technological
progress. When a new design is learned, an intermediate goods producer acquires
the perpetual patent over the design that allows monopoly pricing. The other two
sectors obey perfect competition.
At any given point in time, the nal goods sector produces a homogeneous out-











; 0 <  < 1 ;  > 0 ; (1)
If  < 1, intermediate goods are complementary; they are substitutes if  > 1. This
function displays constant returns to scale over capital and labor inputs.
The economy increases the mass of producer durables types that can be used,
A, either by inventing new designs or by imitating them from a country-specic
international pool of ideas Aw whose size increases exogenously at rate gAw. The
increase in the total amount of producer durables varieties used in production at a
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8given point in time t is given by the following aggregate R&D technology:
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where Aw is the worldwide stock of all ideas that can be used in production if they are
learned, regardless of where they originated; and RI and RC are the amounts of output
that the economy invests in R&D related to innovation and imitation, respectively.
This R&D technology follows Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) and Perez-Sebastian
(2000, 2007).
In equation (2),  weights a knowledge spillover eect from learning new designs
today to future learning productivity. This eect can be positive or negative de-
pending on whether the parameter is larger or smaller than zero, respectively. The
parameter  controls for the fact that two or more researchers can come up with the
same idea either by chance or because of R&D races. Since 0 <  < 1, a congestion
externality or, in other words, duplication of eort is present. The ratio Aw=A in-
corporates an advantage of backwardness similar to the one in Parente and Prescott
(1994) and in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1997), implying that the cost of imi-
tating foreign designs decreases as the worldwide stock gets relatively larger. Since
A is in the denominator, the imitation technology displays diminishing imitation op-
portunities, which cause a negative externality: higher levels of R&D eort today
may decrease the relative size of the international pool of ideas, thus making copying
more costly in the future. The parameter   captures a creative destruction eect,
and follows Jones and Williams (2000). It is assumed that rms have to adopt new
technology in packages composed of these 1 +   designs. Only one of those designs
is really new, whereas the other   represent upgrades that replace the same number
of existing A types of durables goods.
It is well known that (for   suciently small) the markup  charged by intermediate-
goods producers will be determined by the elasticity of substitution,  = 1=[(1 )].
It is also well known that production function (1) takes on the Cobb-Douglas form
Y = ALK1  at the aggregate level; where K =
R A
0 xi di is the country's stock of
physical capital, and  = 1
   (1   ).
Dene gA and r as the rate of change of parameter A and the interest rate,
respectively. Standard methods allow obtaining the optimal steady-state allocation


















 (1   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r   (gY   gA) +  gA
: (4)
Expressions (3) and (4) summarize the inuence of market failures associated with
the non-rilvalrous nature of ideas on the R&D decision. Unlike the social planner,
rms do not take into account the existence of diminishing returns in learning due
to duplication of eort. They equate marginal costs to average, instead of marginal,
R&D productivity. As a consequence, S
sp
R increase with parameter , but Sde
R does
not. The markup induced by monopoly pricing is irrelevant in the central planner's
solution, but raises the decentralized economy's R&D investment. The terms , ,
and  (Aw=A)
=1  =[1 + (Aw=A)
=1 ] capture the eect of current R&D on future
nal-output and R&D productivities, which the decentralized economy does not in-
ternalize. The third term, in particular, represents the negative externality caused
by diminishing imitation opportunities. As we see, this last external eect pushes
up S
sp
R as the economy approaches the technology frontier. The creative-destruction
parameter  , on the other hand, is irrelevant for the social planner. It appears twice
in equation (4). In the numerator because more designs allow for higher prots, and
in the denominator because a larger probability of patent destruction diminishes the
market value of patents. The net inuence of   on Sde
R is positive as long as the
interest rate is larger than the growth rate of the economy. Notice as well that the
rate gA weights the incidence of all these externalities because they depend on future
investment. This will prove useful later on when the econometric model is specied.
Besides the ones related to non-rivalness, there exist other market failures due to
credit rationing (Hall 2005) and partial excludability of ideas (Romer 1990). Both of
them produce underinvestment in R&D. If R&D needs external nancing, the market
will not nance all projects that are socially protable. The problem is amplied by
the uncertainly of invention if investors can not buy protection against it (Arrow
1962). This last eect diminishes as nancial markets develop. Solving the partial
excludability problem, on the other hand, requires the design of eective property
rights such as a patent system.
7
10So far, I have taken into account only eciency considerations. The design of
policy can be, however, a consequence of political pressure. There is an important
literature on the political economy of the size of governments that tries to explain
the ow of resources generated by the public sector (e.g., see Drazen 2000), and
government-funded R&D can be considered simply part of this ow. Probably, the
most basic political theory of government intervention is the Wagner's hypothesis.
Adolph Wagner (1967) defended that the public sector share in GDP will grow con-
tinually as nations industrialize. Wagner provided several reasons for this observation.
First, as national income increases, industrialization and urbanization generates ad-
ditional needs for government services beyond the traditional national defense and
legal system, like cultural and welfare expenditures. Second, government spending
may increase in activities that complement the private sector funding for long-term
investments related to economic development and changes in technology.
Other authors argue that the degree of political rights is an important determinant
of the size of the public sector. Meltzer and Richard (1981), in particular, oer a
theory that implies that extensions of the franchise increase the public sector size,
measured as the share of income redistributed in cash or in services. Increasing
openness can also be a source of public demands for government intervention. It
is clear, for example, that the sophistication of nations like China, South Korea, or
Taiwan have raised concerns about the future international competitiveness of rms
and job losses in certain industries; thus increasing social demands for government
intervention. At this respect, R&D investment is perceived as a way to avoid this
problem (Fagerberg 1988). Openness, however, can also increase budgetary pressure
and make more dicult nance subsidies (e.g., see Schulze and Ursprung 1999 for a
review of the literature).4
Several of these variables can also aect private R&D investment. Financial depth
mitigates the uncertainty and fund availability problems contributing to more inven-
tion investment. A more developed patent protection system raises private expected
prots, although its impact on R&D is not clear (Howitt 2004). Openness can in-
4Empirically, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) nd that democracy does not matter but Wagner's
law does for explaining the share of government revenue on GDP. Some papers on the Political
Sciences literature such as Avelino et al. (2005) nd positive association of some non-R&D-related
components of government spending with democracy. Regarding tests of the eect of openness on
government expenditures, the main message is that there is no robust impact (see Dreher et al. 2008
for a recent contribution).
8
11crease incentives to invest in R&D due to a larger market size, higher competition
levels, and a larger ow of knowledge (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). Finally, a
more stable political environment may generate higher expected returns to a long-run
activity such as R&D.
Empirically, some of these variables that can aect R&D have received support.
For example, Coe and Helpman (1995) and Eaton and Kortum (1996), Lederman and
Maloney (2003), and Acemoglu and Linn (2004) nd that the ow of ideas, nan-
cial depth, and market size matter positively for innovation, respectively. Varsakelis
(2001) estimate that the degree of patent protection encourage R&D investment, al-
though openness does not matter. Agnion et al. (2005) estimate that the degree of
market competition has an inverted U-shaped eect on innovation. Varsakelis (2006)
using patent counts nds that political rights aect positively innovation output.
4 The Model, Data, and Estimation Method
I estimate the following R&D regression:
R&Dit = 0 + 1Dummiesi + 2Controlsit 5 + 3Focusit 5 + "it: (5)
Regression (5) searches for the determinants R&D. The main goal behind this empir-
ical exercise is to test which of the theories described in the previous section receive
support in the data. Proxies for those theories are the ones called Focus variables.
Controls represent other variables that can have an impact on R&D investment. Fi-
nally, I add Dummies that try to capture country xed eects to mitigate a potential
omitted variable bias. Each variable is indexed by country i and time t.
The dependent variable is R&D as a fraction of GDP. We use three dierent R&D
measures: government-funded R&D, private R&D, total R&D; all of them represent
expenditure in millions of constant 2000 dollars valued at purchasing power parities.
The rst measure is employed to search for its determinants. The second one, to
see whether policy can have an impact on private R&D. Total R&D is considered
for comparison. Missing observations were interpolated. I employ two dierent data
sources. The rst one is the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (S&T),
which provides gures from 1981 for OECD nations and a set of non-OECD members
such as Argentina, Israel, and Singapore. The second one is UNESCO.5
5Using investment in basic research as another proxy would be interesting because this component
9
12Dummies are of two types: regional, and legal origin. More specically, I consider
Middle east region, East Asian region, Latin America region, German legal origin,
French legal origin, and UK legal origin. Gallup et al. (1999) and La Porta et al.
(2008), among many others, argue that these type of variables have power to predict
economic performance. They have the ability to capture a variety of country-specic
xed eects related to religion, culture, climate, and the regulatory and institutional
environments. A dummy variable that controls for the R&D data source is also added.
Proxies for eciency considerations in government intervention are: relative total
factor productivity (TFP), the growth rate of TFP, credit to private sector, and
patent protection. As argued above, the technology gap can aect negatively the
socially-optimal allocation to the adaptation of innovations to local conditions. I
then include a measure of relative TFP in the regression. Expressions (3) and (4)
suggest as well the introduction of the TFP growth rate, because it weights the
incidence of non-rilvalness-related externalities. Assuming that relative TFP captures
well the negative external eect associate with it, the estimated coecent on TFP
growth should tell us whether government-funded R&D is aected by other market
failures. In particular, a positive sign would say that knowlege spillovers are behind
public R&D, whereas creative destruction and duplication of eort would be behind a
negative sign. Notice that these two variables can also aect private R&D. Closeness
to the technology frontier can favor the discovery of new inventions. TFP growth, on
the other hand, is related to the impact of created destruction on the market value
of patents, expression (4).
In terms of measurement, TFP is computed relative to the U.S. using as a coun-
try's technology level the residual not explained by physical capital and labor in a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate production specication. Capital stocks are built employing
investment rates from Penn World Tables 6.2 (PWT) and the perpetual inventory
approach. The elasticity of capital is taken to be 1=3. Relative TFP can also aect
the private R&D decision.
To see if credit rationing matters in the private and government R&D decisions,
the regressions incorporate total credit by deposit money banks and other nancial
institutions to the private sector as percentage of GDP from the 2007 update of Beck
is the one that probably suers the most from market failures. S&T oers data for this variable.
However, there are a relatively large number of missing years, and the type of costs included are not
always the same across nations. This makes impossible to put together a reasonable sample.
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13et al. (2000). To proxy for inventor's appropriability issues, I include Park's (2008)
patent protection index. This is an update of Ginarte and Park's (1997). These
authors construct a patent rights index using a coding scheme applied to national
patent laws. They examined the following categories: (1) extent of coverage, (2)
membership in international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection,
(4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) duration of protection. With this information,
they oer an index that ranges from 0 to 5 with the higher values indicating stronger
levels of protection. Theory suggests that the estimated coecients related to the
last two variables should be positive for private R&D but negative for public R&D,
except for patenting that do not have a clear eect on private innovation eort.
Four variables also proxy for political factors: political rights, GDP per capita,
size of government, and openness. Political rights data try to test whether voting
rights matter, as suggested by Meltzer and Richard (1981), and are provided by
Freedom House. Freedom House constructs a discrete index that ranges from 1 to
7. Countries that receive a lower rating are those with less corrupt and more stable
governments, a larger degree of freedom and fairness in elections, with an opposition
that plays a more signicant role in the political system, and citizens that enjoy
more self-determination. Because of that, a negative estimated coecient will imply
a positive eect of political rights.
To test the Wagner's hypothesis, I use the level of GDP per capita and the gov-
ernment share in GDP, both from PWT. With this, I want to see whether R&D
investment follows other types of government spending or, put dierently, whether
is just a consequence of the government's willingness and capacity to mobilize re-
sources.6 Finally, openness can capture political pressure from agents that see their
revenues threaten, but also budgetary considerations. Its estimated coecient, ac-
cording to theory, can be then positive or negative. As a measure of openness, I
employ imports plus exports as a fraction of GDP from WPT.
The control variables included are average years of schooling and population.
Schooling and population are variables that can have an impact on the productivity
of R&D - the former one weights the eciency of the labor input, whereas the latter
aects the size of the domestic market. Educational attainment comes from Barro
and Lee (2001), and is the sum of the average number of years of primary, secondary
and tertiary education in total population aged 15 and over. Total population is
6According to results in la Porta et al. (1999), the size of government could also proxy its quality.
11
14thousands of inhabitants and is uploaded from PWT.
Data are averaged over 5 years for the intervals 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-
00, and 2001-05 to abstract from business-cycle inuences, and alleviate potential
measurement problems. For the schooling variable and the patent protection index
that supply only one observation every ve years, in 1980, 1985, ... 2000, I use the year
within the interval. After excluding nations that do not oer data on all variables, big
oil producers, ex-communist nations, and small economies like Iceland and Cyprus,
I end up with an unbalanced panel with 38 nations and 146 observations.7 The
scale of varibles is chosen to facilitate the interpretation of estimated coecients.
In particluar, shares of ouput and growth rates are included in percentage terms,
other continuous variables are taken in logs, discrete variables { the dummies and the
political-rights index { are not modied.
Endogeneity, and common latent variables that determine jointly the dependent
and explanatory variables can be a source of bias. For example, both forms of R&D
and the patent system can respond to variations in the existing technological oppor-
tunities. To try to minimize this potential problem, I use rst lags of the explanatory-
variable 5-year-averages as regressors.8 Given this, the number of data points avail-
able for the estimation exercise reduces to 119. Descriptive statistics of the dierent
variables are oered in Table 1.
5 Results
Estimation is carried out separately for the whole sample, the S&T sample, and
excluding the 22-OECD economies. The S&T group is compused of 27 rich and
middle income economies. The non-22-OECD set includes the 17 poorest economies
in the original sample.9 OLS estimated coecients are in Tables 2 and 3. The
Tables also report white-heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parenthesis.
The last rows indicate that all regressions are able to explain a large fraction of the
7The nations are the ones in footnote 3 excluding Cyprus, Ecuador, Hungary, Iceland, Mauritius,
and Uganda.
8Because private and public R&D most likely suer severely from these simultaneity problems, I
do not include public R&D as a regressor when private R&D is the dependent variable, even though
the literature has found it an important determinant (e.g., see David et al. 2000).
9The 22 OECD group is the one rst considered by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). The
S&T sample adds to those (excluding Iceland) Turkey, Israel, Singapore, South Korea, Mexico,
and Argentina. Actually, the S&T economies are the ones listed in Figure 2. Estimation on the


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18variance of the dependent variables; in particular, around 80% for total and private
R&D, and 70% for public R&D.
For the time being, I do not include GDP per capita as a regressor, this is done for
comparison. Table 2 reports the results. Let us focus on total R&D { columns (1),
(4) and (7). Schooling, government spending, and relative TFP appear signicant in
all samples and, except for schooling in the non-22-OECD group, with strong positive
sign. Population and the patent index also show positive power with the exception of
the same country group. This is true as well for openness, with the exception of the
whole sample. Private credit is only important in the set of rich and middle income
economies. Finally, political rights and TFP growth show no explanatory power.
The picture is, however, dierent when more disaggregated data form the depen-
dent variables. This evidences the value added of splitting total R&D in its two com-
ponents. Leave aside for a moment results with the non-22-OECD sample (columns
(7) to (9)) that are distinctly dierent. As with total R&D, population, the govern-
ment share, and relative TFP are strong positive determinants of private and public
R&D, and TFP growth shows no power. Schooling, private credit, and the patent
index have positive sighs when they are signicant, but show clearly more power
to explain private R&D than public innovation eort. Political rights and openness
have dierent eects on both R&D components. On the one hand, openness aects
positively private R&D, but has a negative non-signicant impact on public R&D.
Political rights, on the other, depicts in the S&T sample (column (5)) where rich
nations dominate at a larger extent two opposing signicant eects { positive for the
former R&D component and negative for the latter. Summarizing, we could say that
there are some interesting patterns: in general, eciency proxies show stronger power
to predict private R&D, and some political-economy variables have opposing eects
on R&D components.
Focusing next on the non-22-OECD nations, these patterns do not hold. E-
ciently variables do not seem to be more impotant to predict private eort, and there
are no opposing eects. In particular, private R&D is positively associated with the
degree of openness, credit, government spending, and relative TFP. These last two
variables are also strong and positive determinants of public R&D. But TFP growth
and schooling also contribute to explain the public component, the latter with a
negative sign.
We have not employed yet GDP per capita as a regressor. Results when we in-
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19clude it are presented in Table 3. This exercise will help us disentangle whether
some variables show power just because there are correlated with GDP. This is im-
portant because the Wagner's hypothesis establishes that GDP per capita is a main
determinant of the public-expenditure share.
The main nding in Table 3 is that the general patterns found previously obtain
additional support, although there are important dierences between poor and rich
nations. It becomes evident that real GDP per capita is an important determinant of
the government-funded R&D share. Notice that, compared to Table 2, the signicance
of eciency related variables, that is, private credit, patent index, relative TFP, and
TFP growth do not change in the private R&D regressions (columns (2) and (5)),
whereas their signicance highly diminishes and the estimated coecients sometimes
ip signs in the public R&D specications (columns (3) and (6)). The exception is the
non-22-OECD sample, where eciency variables loss all signicance to explain private
R&D, whereas TFP growth and credit (the last one with a negative sign) remain
important to explain public R&D. The signicance and sign of the other variables'
coecients, in particular, population, schooling, openness, political rights, and the
government share do not change much. Exceptions are schooling and openness that
become negative and signicant for public R&D in the non-22-OECD sample and for
private R&D in the S&T group, respectively.
6 Conclusion
This paper searches for the determinants of government-funded R&D. Its main goal
has been to disentangle whether the eciency considerations overwhelmingly empha-
sized by the theoretical literature are indeed the main driving force behind public
R&D expenditures. Another goal of the paper has been to nd out whether other
types of R&D policy can have an impact on private R&D.
The paper nds that private and government R&D are, in general, driven by
dierent forces, and that these forces vary as well between country groups. When we
exclude low income countries, results imply that private R&D responds to eciency
considerations, whereas public R&D mainly to political factors. Market size proxied
by population, labor-force schooling levels, the degree of openness, private credit to
the private sector, the distance to the technology frontier, and the patent protection
levels predict well private innovation expenditures, and their impact is positive.
14
20Government spending and political rights also aect positively private R&D in the
rich and middle income economy set. This can imply that the government supplies
services that increase the productivity of the private R&D sector, like eective legal
protection and basic infrastructure, and that the quality of the service increases with
political freedom in those economies.
Public R&D, on the other hand, is positively determine by GDP levels, as the
Wagner's hypothesis suggests, population, and also by the government share in GDP.
The rst two imply that R&D expenditures carried out by government can be asso-
ciated with the perceived additional needs for government services brought about by
the process of industrialization and urbanization. Its relationship with government
size, in turn, suggests that public R&D varies with the capacity of government to
mobilize resources. Political rights also have a strong impact on public eort, but
this eect is negative, that is, the opposite to what Meltzer and Richard's (1981)
insight suggests. The eect of political rights on public R&D is then not driven by
redistributed forces. Finally, openness shows a weak negative association with public
R&D, suggesting that budgetary preassure might be having an eect.
In developing economies, however, eciency considerations play a more clear role
in public innovation eort. Along with the size of government and GDP per capita,
the lack of private credit and knowledge-spillovers considerations are positively related
to public R&D. The fact that, in this country group, schooling shows a negative sign
may mean that governments try to ght against the lack of formal education through
investment in R&D that should help to form new scientists.
In light of the results, R&D policy is eective at promoting R&D investment.
However, the types of policy measures that are eective can dier across countries.
Measures directed to improving credit access, patent protection, and getting closer
to the technology frontier fosters private R&D in rich nations, but are not a driving
force in developing countries. In these last economies, private R&D responds mainly
to public eorts, which most likely helps to build the knowledge, human and physical
capital bases necessary for successful R&D.
Evidence then suggests that governments do not implement optimal policy, but
a second best due to political distortions. This has some important implications.
Possibly the main one is that more research on political economy theories of innova-
tion is essential to understand and improve R&D policy. From the point of view of
policymakers, the lesson is that direct R&D interventions need to be reassessed to
15
21make it closer to eciency considerations. In addition, results warn that the standard
argument that a country's government should spend more in R&D just because other
countries spend a relatively higher share of GDP in R&D is not well founded, be-
cause politics and not eciency is the dominant force. Further research is necessary
to address these and other important related issues.
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